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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BOUNTIFUL STATE BANK, a Utah corporation, FARMERS STATE BANK a
Utah corporation, SOUTH DAVIS SECURITY BANK, a Utah corporation, and
DA VIS COUNTY BANK, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
11807

W. S. BRIMHALL, COMMISSIONER OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, and WALKER BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought in the District Court of
Salt Lake County by plaintiffs Bountiful State Bank,
Farmers State Bank, South DaYis Security Bank and
Davis County Bank (herein sometimes referred to as
the "Competing Banks") against \V. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah
(the "Commissioner") and "\V alker Bank & Trust Company ("\Valk er Bank") for review of a decision of the
t'ommissioner granting the application of Walker Bank
for permission to establish a branch bank in Centerville,
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Davis County, Utah. The action \ms brought pursuant
to Section 7-1-26, Utah Cocle Annotated l 9:J3, as amended. The Competing Banks were protestauts to the appliration of \Valker Bank in the proceedings before the
Commissioner.
DISPOSITION I)J LO\VER COURT
The District Court granted the motion of \Yalker
Bank for a Summary Judgment which determined that
the Commissioner's Order granting the application of
\Valker Bank for the branch bank was supported by the
0\·idence at the hearing before the Commissioner, that
the Order was not arbitrary or capricious nor did the
Commissioner abuse his discretion, that the Order of the
Commissioner granting the application to Walker Bank
''should be and is here by sustained'' and that the complaint of the Competing Banks should be dismissed with
prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
seek affirmance of the judgment of the
District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents accept the statement of facts of Appellants with the following clarifications and additions:
The Commissioner specifically found that all of the
Competing Banks are "financially stable and secure
i11stitutions aud surh stability would not be jeopardized
2

or 1Ji(• i11t0r0sts of the puhlil' impaired
the establishment and operation of the proposed branch." Among
<>ther [hi11gs, the Commissioner conclude>cl that "increased competition from the proposed branch bank would not
umeasonahly intPrfere with the operation of the existing banks and branches [in the area] . . . . would not
jeopanlize the derJOsitors of such hanks, would not interfrre \\ ith tl1e ability of these banks to maintain their
fiwmcial strength and would Hot impair their ability to
compete with the applicant bank and other banks."
The Commissioner further conclude(} in Conclusion
No. + (R. 33) that "the public convenience and advantage would be subscn·ed and promoted by the establishment of the proposed branch at the location pro1;1Jsed .... "

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE D E C I S I 0 N OF THE
SIONER DID NOT IGNORE THE IMP ACT
OF THE PROPOSED BRANCH UPON THE
OPERATIONS OF BOUNTIFUL ST ATE
BANK.
In Appellants' POINT I, they take the nry limited
,·ie\v that the Commissioner "ignored" the impact of
-walker Bank branch on the operations of the Center,·ille> lmrneh of Bountiful State Bank. In doing so, Ap1iella11ts ''ignore'' the Findings and Conclusions of the
( 'ommissioner (R. 31-33) which clearly demonstrate
tl1at the Commissioner directly considered the effect of
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the Walker Bank branch on the operations of the other
banks in the area. He specifically concluded that the
Walker Bank branch ''would not unreasonably interfere
with the operation of the existing hanks and branches"
located in south Davis County. This conclusion covers
the effect of the Walker Bank branch on the operations
of all of the Competing Banks, including Bountiful State
Bank and including the Centerville branch of Bountiful
State Bank. The Findings also clearly indicate that the
effect on the Competing Banks was considered. For example, in Finding No. 11, the Commissioner determined
that the Competing Banks have operated from their respective places of business "a sufficient period of time
to have an established business at such locations," that
all such banks "are financially stable and secure and
such stability \vould not be jeopardized or the interests
of the public impaired by the establishment and operation'' of the Walker Bank branch. The Commissioner
also found that the Competing Banks have been able to
compete successfully in the past with other financial
institutions and, coupled with his conclusion that competition from the Walker Bank branch would not unreasonably interfere with the operation of any of the Competing Banks, it is clear that the Commissioner very seriously considered the ''impact'' of the Walker Bank branch
upon the operations of all of the Competing Banks, including Bountiful State Bank.
It is true that at the hearing Mr. Jeppsen, the
President of Bountiful State Bank, opined that competition from the Walker Bank branch would be "disastrous'' to the Centerville branch of Bountiful State
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Bank ( R. 383). Of course, this was offered only as an
opinion and an opinion that may not have been shared
by the Commissioner. There was substantial evidence
which would support a contrary opinion. We are sure
that the Competing Banks would not contend that the
Commissioner is compelled to believe all of the evidence
much less all of the opinions that are given.
It is, of course, the Commissioner's job as an expert
in the banking field to weigh facts and opinions and
arrive at his own conclusions. But even Mr. Jeppsen was
only discussing the effect on the Centerville branch of
his bank. On cross-examination he testified that the
safety of the depositors of the bank as a whole (which
necessarily includes the depositors at the Centerville
branch) would not be jeopardized (R. 389). He did not
testify that the effect on the stockholders of the bank
would be ''disastrous'', but only that the profits of the
lHmk might be reduced. He did not even testify that the
Bountiful State Bank would become unprofitable because
of the Walker Bank branch, but only that profits would
he diminished (R. 389). This, of course, is what may be
the result of any competition. From a bank whose resources have grown from approximately $4,000,000 in
1934 to $11,600,000 in 1967 (Exhibit 1, Table IV-8, p. 57)
whose loans and discounts increased 15% between 1960
and 1967 (Exhibit 1, Table IV-11, p. 63; R. 26-27, Admission 11) and which has successfully competed with
a new unit bank in the area (R. 390, 393-394), a little
additional competition from Walker Bank would be a
healthy situation, at least from the point of view of the
public.
5

ot all the Competing Banks foresaw the same
"disaster'' as Bountiful State Bank. Note the testimony
of the President of Farmers State Bank (R. 298-331),
particularly his comments concerning the growth of his
bank in face of new competition in the past (R. 319-321),
his predictions of growth in the local economy (R. 322324) and his opinion that his bank would safely survive
the "\Valker Bank competition (R. 327-329). See also the
testimony of the President of South Davis Security Bank
(R. 346-379) outlining the efforts of his bank in breaking
into the south Davis area, competing successfully with
the existing banks (R. 361-364, 368), that he presently
is competing for business with Walker Bank and the
competition wouldn't change "a lot" if Walker's opened
a branch in Centerville (R. 372).
In substance, the Competing Banks' complaint is
that there ·would be more competition if the Walker
Bank branch was established. This we can concede and,
of course, competition is quite appropriate in banking as
well as in most other business activity. However, the
branch banking statutes are not designed to protect
banks from competition or to turn banks into public
utilitit'S guaranteed a profit. Banking is a regulated industry, but it is regulated for the public interest, not for
the interest of existing banks. The statutory criteria is
the public convenience and advantage, not the convenience and ad\·antage of existing banks. For a discussion
of this important distinction see In re Application of
Howard Savings Institution of Newark, 32 N.J. 209, 159
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A.2d 113 at 123 ;Da,uplt in Deposit Trust Co. i:. Myers, 401
Pa. 230, 164 A.2d 86 at 92 (1960); Delau,·are County
N atiunal Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416
at 422; Blairsville National Ba<nk v. IIIyers (Pa. 1963),
181 A.2d 655; Philadelphia Sai:ing Fund Society v .
•11yers, 406 Pa. 328, 179 A.2d 209.
While it is certainly proper for the Commissioner to
consider the effect of new competition on existing banks
and while it is beyond question that the Commissioner
did so in this case, the Commissioner is not required
by any statutory provision to consider this effect in the
sense used by Appellants. Appellants cite 7-1-26(1), referring to "unreasonable interference" with an established financial institution. This provision does not
apply to branch bank applications but only to applications for new bank charters and charters for other
financial organizations supervised by the Commissioner,
such as savings and loans, credit unions and small loan
licensees (see 7-3-12; 7-13-3 ; 7-9-3 ; former § 7-10-3; also
the reference in 7-1-26(1) to the character of "the incorporators or organizers" can only apply to new organizations not to existing banks applying for branches).
Where branch bank applications were intended to be
covered, as in subsection (4) of 7-1-26 relating to court
reyiew, the Legislature was specific in the reference to
branch banks.
The criteria for establishment of branch banks is
set forth in § 7-3-6, UCA 1953. There are three criteria
applicable to all branch banks and that are applicable
in this case: (1) adequate capitalization; (2) location
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of the branch in a permissible area (within the corporate
limits of a city or town where no unit bank is located
'
within Salt Lake City, or ·within unincorporated areas
of Salt Lake County) ; and ( 3) proof to the satisfaction
of the Commissioner that the public convenience and
advantage ·will be subserved and promoted by the establishment of the branch bank. See Walker Bank d';
Trust Cnmpa11y v. Brimhall,
U.2d
, 461 P.2d
730 (No\'. 20, 1969). The next to the last paragraph of
§ 7-3-6 establishes a fourth criteria for some branches
located in Salt Lake County, viz., that if the branch is
located in unincorporated areas, it shall not be established ''in such close proximity to an established bank or
branch as to unreasonably interfere with the business
thereof.'' But where the branch is located within the corporate limits of a city or town as is the case here and
as must be the case for all branches outside of Salt Lake
County, only the three criteria are applicable.
Thus. it cannot be said in any sense that as a matter
of law the Commissioner must deny a branch application
because the operation of that branch in competing for
husiuess with an existing bank might reduce the profits
of the existing bank. This is the natural result of any
competition and certainly was within the contemplation
of the Legislature \\'hen it established the criteria for
branch bank applications. Excessive competition, as in
areat' with too many banks, for example, can have an
effect on the public by affecting the financial stability
of an existing bank so seriously that members of the
puhliC' might be damaged. This might result in a decline
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in the ability of the bank to perform proper sen·ices or,
iu an extreme case, in the insolvency of the bank. These
are proper concerns for the Legislature, for the Commissioner and for the public at large. These are the questions the Commissioner addressed himself to as evidenced by the Findings and Conclusions previously cited. To
insulate existing banks from new competition or to apply
a standard which prohibited new branches if existing
banks might lose profits would clearly be improper and
not authorized or required by our laws.
POINT II
THE COMMISSIONER MADE ALL REQUIRED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
R E G A R D I N G T H E W AL K E R BANK
BRANCH AND THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR SETTING ASIDE HIS DECISION.
The Competing Banks apparently seek in POINT II
of their Brief to have this Court set aside its recent decision in the case of Walker Bank & Trust Company v.
Brimhall, supra, which involved a proposed branch in
South Ogden which would serve Ogden, other parts
of -vv eber County and north Davis County. The basic
argument of the Competing Banks appears to be that
because Walker Bank indicated in this case that it would
seek business for its Centerville branch from Centerville, Bountiful and other cities, towns and unincorporated areas in south Davis County, coupled with the fact
that the proposed branch location is in a shopping center
9

near the boundary line behveen Centerville and Bountiful, in some way the criteria for establishing a branch
bank have not been met. They repeat the argument
whieh this court rejected in the Brimhall case that existing banks are insulated from competition except from
new unit banks or, to put it another way, that branch
banks cannot be established in locations which will compete for hm::iness with existing banks.
The holding of this Court in lValker Bank cf; Trust
Cmnpauy r. Brimhall, supra, was that the branch banking laws clo not limit the service area of a branch. If the
hrauch is to br established in a lawful location, it can
do business with anyone and can compete for business
with any existiug bank. This Court did say that geography could he a fador in the question of public convenience all(1 advantage and it is obvious from the Findings aml Conclusions that were made that geography
in this sousP was taken into account by the Commissioner.
\Vl1ik t}w Competing Banks assert that the Commissioner failed to make Findings on the geographical loeaitou of tl1e proposed branch, this is a clear misreading
of t be Fincli11g-s and Conclusions that were made. Finding of Fact No. 8 indicates the nature of the City of
Cenknille as it relates to the statutory criteria for lorn ting hnrneli hanks. The precise location of the branch
i:-: refcnell to in Fiucliug No. 10 and this location in
refrrence to the location of existing banks is referred
to in Fimling No. 11. The service area of the proposed
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branch is referred to in Finding No. 16. It would serve
no useful purpose to the Competing Banks or to anyone
rlse to have a specific Finding to the effect that Center\'ille and Bountiful adjoin one another, that each are
residential communities as distinguished from industrial
an•as or, least of all, that the principal stockholder of
\Valker Bank is \Vestern Bancorporation. The Commissioner did find that \Valker Bank is the largest state
bank in Utah (Finding No. 7) and that existing banks
se1Te in the same area proposed to be served from the
\Valker Bank branch (Finding No. 11). Surely, details
of the economics of the area, assessed valuation statistics, traffic patterns, physical features of the area, size
and location of existing banks, and similar details need
not be specified, although such matters were in evidence
and before the Commissioner for his consideration, including all of the matters which the Competing Banks
now contend at pages 15 and 19 of their Brief, are required Findings. \Ve wonder what further Findings the
Competing Banks would have the Commissioner make T
If the Commissioner is obligated to be more specific
than he has been in this case, it appears that you enter
into the area of probing the mental proeesses of the
Commissioner which was specifically condemned by this
court in Zions First National Bank v. Taylor, 15 U.2d
239, 390 P.2d 854 (Syllabus 3 and 4).
One must also consider that all of these arguments
now made were fully and forcefully made by the Competing Banks to the Commissioner ( R. 489-513) and such
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arguments were rejected because the application was
granted. It is also significant that the Commissioner decided to permit the branch in this case even though at
the time the Attorney General had ruled that the application for the South Ogden branch must be rejected
and this Court had not ruled to the contrary (the Commissioner acted in this case on February 28, 1969, prior
to the N o\·ember 20 decision of this court). Thus, there
is not the slightest doubt but that the Commissioner
would ban' arriYcd at the same conclusion, even though
he did not make a negative Finding that the geographic
location did not militate against the public convenience
and adYantage. Apparently this vms not true in Salt
Lake City r. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 581, 137
P.2d 364. Hence, such case is not applicable here.
The proper standard to be applied as established
by the branch banking statutes and by the decision of
this court in the Brimhall case is the public convenience
and advantage. Findings and Conclusions were made by
the Commissioner in this case that the public convenience
and advantage would be subserved and promoted by the
establishment of the Walker Bank branch in Centerville
at the location proposed by the applicant. Tested by this
stam1anl, tlH• only question remaining for this Court,
is whether such determination was arbitrary and caprieious. It is not the function of this Court to substitute
its judgment for the judgment of the Commissioner or
to require Findings and Conclusions to be redrafted to
11eg-::i.tivc all arguments of the unsuccessful parties to the
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administrative hearing. See Walker Bank <f Trust Company 1·. Brimhall, supra; .11 ountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Company v. Public Service Commission, 107
Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184; Salt Lake Transfer v. Public
Service Commission, 11 U.2d 121, 355 P.2d 706; Withers
I'. Golding, 100 Utah 179, 111 P.2d 550; Erkman v. Civil
Service Commission, 114 Utah 228, 198 P.2d 238; Building Service Employees, Etc. v. Newhouse Realty Co.,
97 Utah 562, 95 P.2d 507; Hotel Uta.Ji v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 443, 211 P.2d 200.
Where, as in this case, the Competing Banks received a fair hearing (and this is conceded by the Appellants on page 10 of their Brief) and where the Commissioner has made Findings and Conclusions on the
required three statutory criteria set forth in Walker
Bank & Trust Company v. Brimhall, supra, the reviewing court should affirm the decision unless it is plain
that the Commissioner has acted arbitrarily. There can
be no question that in the three very full days of hearings before the Commissioner, the Competing Banks
were able to present what evidence they had and arguments they might make to defeat the application of
Bank. No item of evidence offered by the Competing Banks was refused. Time for argument was afforded. All of the evidence presented was thoroughly
considered by the Commissioner as evidenced by his detailed Findings and Conclusions. In the absence of a
clear showing of arbitrariness, the court should not in-
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terf ere but should affirm the decision of the Commissioner as \\'as done by the court below.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the District Court of Salt Lake
County should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
H. R. WALDO, JR.

Of JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Respondent
Walker Bank & Trust Company
VERNON ROMNEY, Attorney
General
H. WRIGHT VOLKER, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
W. S. Brimhall
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